North Korea's Trojan Horse
By Masashi Nishihara
Thursday, August 14, 2003; Page A19
YOKOSUKA, Japan -- It is unfortunate that North Korea's proposal for a
"nonaggression pact" with the United States appears to be gaining support among
some prominent U.S. policymakers and other influential figures. Such a pact
would in fact lead only to a withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and
perhaps even to Japan's justifying the development of its own nuclear
weapons.
North Korea believes that its national security has been seriously
threatened by a series of President Bush's remarks and acts, including his "axis
of evil" speech in January 2002, which included North Korea as one of the evils,
and his war against Saddam Hussein. North Korean leaders believe that President
Bush is aiming for "regime change" in Pyongyang. Therefore, from the viewpoint
of their leader, Kim Jong Il, North Korea needs nuclear weapons to dissuade
Washington from attacking. As an alternative, Kim would accept a nonaggression
pact with the United States to guarantee the security of his regime.
But by deliberately protracting negotiations concerning the format of
multilateral talks, North Korea has actually been buying time to develop its
nuclear weapons further. Indeed, Pyongyang's agreement to the multilateral talks
involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia does not
offer much reason for optimism. Pyongyang can find all kinds of excuses for
stalling the talks and continuing to work on its nuclear weapons.
The principal condition for the negotiations that North Korea will try
to impose on the United States is the proposed nonaggression pact with
Washington. In the past North Korea has demanded such an agreement in return for
its renouncing its nuclear weapons program and permitting full inspections of
its nuclear facilities.
But this is a dangerous offer that could eventually backfire on the
United States. Washington should not sign a pact stating that it has no
intention of launching a nuclear attack on North Korea.
A nonaggression pact would be extremely risky. First, how would the
signatories ensure that the on-site inspections of suspected facilities were
complete and that North Korea had in fact abandoned its nuclear arms
programs?
Second, once a nonaggression pact was signed, Pyongyang might demand
the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. It would argue that an
American presence on the Korean peninsula was no longer needed now that both
sides had promised not to wage war against each other. Moreover, the South
Korean public would be likely to support North Korea's demand.
Third, if the American troops left South Korea, Pyongyang would appeal
to its South Korean "brothers" to call for a united Korea without a U.S. role.
In addition, some Japanese, particularly those in Okinawa, would probably argue
that American bases in Okinawa ought to be downgraded or closed.
Finally, and most important, a nonaggression pact between North Korea
and the United States would conflict with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. A
North Korea without nuclear weapons would still possess biological and chemical
weapons and could use them to attack Japan. In such an event, the U.S. forces in
Japan could not help defend Japan in accordance with their bilateral treaty,
since the United States would already have promised not to attack North Korea.
Facing that possibility, Tokyo could no longer rely on its alliance with
Washington and thus might decide to develop its own retaliatory nuclear
weapons.
Instead of a nonaggression pact, the United States, together with Japan
and South Korea, should offer diplomatic recognition to Pyongyang. Bilateral and
multilateral talks involving North Korea have already demonstrated the de facto
recognition of that country by the three countries. If it were made official,
the three countries could open embassies in Pyongyang, which would then be
better able to observe the country and to continue communicating with the
government.
In the meantime, the United States and Japan should target nonmilitary
sanctions at the North Korean leaders to convince them that their tactics of
buying time are not paying off. Such sanctions should include measures to detect
and shelve the trade of technologies and weapons of mass destruction, as well as
to retard the trade of illicit drugs and counterfeit currencies. This can be
done through the close observation and possible interdiction of North Korean
ships on the high seas.
Last month, using the excuse of stricter safety regulations, Japan
succeeded in temporarily shutting down the visit to Japan of a North Korean
ferry that allegedly was being used as a spy ship and for the illegal purchases
of technologies. This was a good first step in the right direction.
The writer is president of Japan's National Defense Academy.
c 2003 The Washington Post
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