The head of the U.S. delegation to a conference reviewing the status of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty says parties to the treaty are
obligated to each other to keep this collective security arrangement
strong for the indefinite future.・

Ambassador Jackie Sanders told participants in the seventh NPT Review
Conference at the United Nations May 19 that efforts to thwart treaty
violators must include specific actions to ensure that companies and
citizens in NPT states are not contributing to proliferation.・

Sanders also said that parties to the treaty must make clear that there
will be significant consequences if any NPT party strays from its
nonproliferation obligations.・Taking action at an early stage against
those who are not complying with the treaty, she said, is better than
waiting until it will be more difficult to dissuade the proliferators and
we will have less time to do so.・

Recent revelations stemming from nuclear procurement activities by the
A.Q. Khan network have made clear that all must be vigilant to prevent
their territories from being used to further nuclear weapons acquisition,・
Sanders said. Even strongly committed treaty members have found, she said,
that secret procurement networks have penetrated their territory.

NPT supplier states, both nuclear- and non-nuclear weapons states,
should not authorize the export of any nuclear-related item unless they
are satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons,・she said. when in doubt about a possible diversion
risk, it is best to forego the export.・

To ensure that NPT members do not inadvertently help a country acquire
nuclear weapons, Sanders said it is important to take action against an
illegal export during the transport phase.・Once an item has moved beyond
the territory of the original supplier, she said, it still might be
possible to impede the transfer whether in transshipment through another
country, or, on the high seas.・

Sanders talked about the important role the two-year-old Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) can play in preventing nuclear items from
reaching states or non-state actors of nuclear proliferation concern・and
thereby promote the NPT's nonproliferation goals. PSI is a cooperative,
multilateral collection of activities -- for which more than 60 nations
have expressed support -- designed to prevent illicit trafficking of
weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems and related materials to and
from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern worldwide.

Sanders also addressed recent NPT-related activities by Iran, North Korea
and Libya:

-- Iran, she said, should offer objective, verifiable guarantees that 妬t
is not using a purportedly peaceful program to hide a nuclear weapons
program, or, to conduct additional clandestine nuclear work elsewhere in
the country.・

-- North Korea should return expeditiously and without preconditions to
the Six-Party Talks,・Sanders said, and commit to the complete,
verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program.・

-- Libya chose to meet its treaty obligations, the ambassador said, and
in doing so set an important standard for how countries in violation of
their nonproliferation undertakings can voluntarily return to compliance
and strengthen global confidence and security.・

For additional information about nuclear nonproliferation, see Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation
(http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/arms_control.html).・

Following is the text of Sanders remarks:

(begin text)

United States Mission to the United Nations
Press Release
May 19, 2005

Statement by Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Special Representative of the
President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on Articles I and
II, in the First Committee of the 2005 Review Conference [RevCon] of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons [NPT], May 19, 2005

On March 7 of this year, President Bush urged all NPT parties to take
strong action to confront the threat of noncompliance with the NPT.� In
the U.S. opening statement, Assistant Secretary [Stephen] Rademaker made
clear that the U.S. delegation would focus considerable attention on this
issue.� We should work together at this RevCon and in this Main Committee
to recognize the depths of this problem and to agree on the main
principles of our response.� While these [Treaty] violations have
undermined the security of all NPT parties, we can and must seek to
correct these problems by holding accountable those in noncompliance and
seek to deter future violations by setting in place new policies to deter
future violations.

Participants have already heard much about the events of the past five
years.� North Korea's consistent violations before it announced its
intention to withdraw from the NPT, and its February 10 assertion that it
has manufactured nuclear weapons, have created great instability in
Northeast Asia and threaten the NPT regime.� States in the region are
confronted by a country with a history of provocation and belligerency
that has declared that it has nuclear weapons.� These developments
underscore the critical importance for our common security and for the
continued strength of the nuclear nonproliferation regime that North Korea
return to compliance with the NPT.� North Korea should return
expeditiously and without preconditions to the Six-Party Talks and commit
to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear
program.

In the Middle East, we applaud Libya for choosing to meet its NPT
obligations.�� By doing so, it set an important standard for how countries
in violation of their nonproliferation undertakings can voluntarily return
to compliance and strengthen global confidence and security.� Regrettably,
however, since the last RevCon the world also learned of the Iranian
regime's broad-based, long-term secret effort to acquire a fissile
material production capability.� Iran pursued these programs, which could
give Iran a nuclear weapons capability, for nearly 20 years and in
violation of its NPT and IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
[nuclear] safeguards undertakings.� The security consequences for the
Middle East of these developments are grave.� We encourage Iran to respond
positively to the EU-3 [France, Germany and the United Kingdom], to fully
suspend and permanently cease all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, to dismantle equipment and facilities related to such
activities, to bring into force and implement the Additional Protocol, and
to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve outstanding questions and meet
all IAEA Board requests.� Iran should provide objective and verifiable
guarantees in order to demonstrate that it is not using a purportedly
peaceful program to hide a nuclear weapons program or to conduct
additional clandestine nuclear work elsewhere in the country.� We share
the desire of European governments to secure Iran's adherence to its NPT
obligations through peaceful and diplomatic means.

In addition to keeping pressure on North Korea and Iran, what should NPT
parties be doing consistent with their Article I and II obligations to
help prevent future cases of noncompliance?

Article I requires the nuclear-weapon States not in any way to assist,
encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.� To fulfill
these obligations, the nuclear-weapon States must establish and implement
comprehensive and effective export controls, including on dual-use items.�
The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility as they have
possessed nuclear weapons infrastructures for decades.� Given the interest
of certain non-nuclear-weapon States and non-state actors in seeking the
means to build nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must effectively
protect against theft or unauthorized transfer of technology, equipment
and material useful in the development and manufacture of nuclear
weapons.� Of course, their stockpiles of weapons and fissile material for
weapons must be closely guarded.

Article II requires the non-nuclear-weapon States not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and
not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other explosive nuclear devices.� Fulfillment of this
obligation requires that non-nuclear-weapon States refrain from activities
designed to develop a nuclear weapons capability.� Further, they should
provide transparency into their activities sufficient to demonstrate their
peaceful purpose, and have in place the necessary laws and regulations to
enforce their Article II obligations.

NPT supplier states, both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, should
not authorize the export of any nuclear-related item unless they are
satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.� Adhering to this principle strongly reinforces the
nonproliferation objective of the NPT.� When in doubt about a possible
diversion risk, it is best to forego the export.� By doing so, NPT
supplier states can avoid inadvertently assisting a possible future NPT
violator in acquiring capabilities useful for a nuclear weapons program.�
If a state has violated the NPT's nonproliferation obligations, then all
nuclear cooperation with that state should terminate.� If an NPT party is
engaged in nuclear weapons-related activities, it is very difficult to
ensure that nuclear supply, even if originally intended for peaceful
applications, would not be diverted and used in the activities that
violate the Treaty.��

The revelations associated with the [A.Q.] Khan nuclear procurement
network have made clear that all must be vigilant to prevent their
territories from being used to further nuclear weapons acquisition.� In
recent years, many NPT states with strong commitments to the Treaty found
that secret networks had penetrated their own territory.� It is important
that all NPT parties remain vigilant against the prospect of these
procurement networks and have the authority necessary to move against such
illegality.� UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1540 was
passed in April 2004 in large part for this very purpose.� Among its
requirements is the establishment by all states of effective national
legal and regulatory measures to criminalize the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials.� Doing
so will embed NPT obligations in national laws and regulations, and create
the basis for effective enforcement and prosecution if citizens violate
the treaty obligations undertaken by their governments.� All NPT parties
with experience in implementing such controls should be willing to assist
others in meeting the requirements of the resolution.� Full implementation
of [Resolution] 1540 by all states will strengthen enforcement of Articles
I and II of the NPT.

Another activity that can help to ensure NPT parties do not
inadvertently assist a state to acquire nuclear weapons is to take action
against an illegal export during the transport phase.� If an item has left
the territory of the original supplier, there may still be an opportunity
to impede the transfer whether in transshipment through another country or
on the high seas.� Consistent with their national legal authorities and
legislation and international law and frameworks, states should take
cooperative action to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking.� The
Proliferation Security Initiative is a cooperative activity supported by
more than 60 states.� It can play an important role in preventing nuclear
items from reaching states or non-state actors of nuclear proliferation
concern and thus promoting the NPT's nonproliferation goals.

Recent activity on two international conventions is also notable in the
context of advancing the NPT's nonproliferation goals.� The International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, approved by
the U.N. General Assembly on April 13, will strengthen the international
legal framework to combat nuclear terrorism upon its entry into force.�
The United States also strongly supports the ongoing effort to include
nonproliferation transport offenses and a complimentary shipboarding
regime to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation.� This effort will significantly expand the
international legal basis to impede, prosecute and punish those persons or
entities that are involved in maritime transport of proliferation-related
shipments.

What more can NPT parties do to strengthen Article II's ban on the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons?�

First, NPT parties must have strong declaratory policies that establish
the necessity of compliance with the NPT.� It should be clear that there
is zero tolerance for noncompliance with the NPT's nonproliferation
undertakings, and that NPT parties are prepared to take firm and prompt
action to hold any violator accountable for its actions.� At a minimum,
this should entail a cutoff of all nuclear-related cooperation.� Such a
step is prudent not only to prevent diversion to a possible nuclear
weapons program, but it is good policy to terminate peaceful nuclear
cooperation with NPT violators.� Such benefits should be reserved only for
NPT parties in full compliance with the Treaty.�

NPT parties should also seek, through appropriate means, to halt the use
of nuclear material or equipment acquired or produced by an NPT state as
result of a material violation of the NPT's nonproliferation
undertakings.� These items should be eliminated or returned to the
original supplier.�

NPT parties should affirm their willingness to report cases of
noncompliance with Article II to the U.N. Security Council.� The Council
should act promptly in such circumstances to determine a response,
particularly when a case constitutes a threat to international peace and
security.�

Regardless of what measures are imposed against a violator or by whom,
it is essential that any lifting of punitive measures be strictly linked
to verifiable actions and be phased in over a period of time.� Among the
actions that must be taken by the noncompliant party are the full
implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol and transparency sufficient
to demonstrate that the prior offender's nuclear program has become fully
consistent with its NPT obligations.� Moreover, NPT parties are fully
justified in insisting on certain limits on the offender's future nuclear
program, even after full compliance has returned.��

Finally, to strengthen the NPT's nonproliferation obligations requires
that NPT parties understand that the prohibition in Article II against the
manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon must apply to more than
just an assembled nuclear weapon.� In an extreme case, an NPT party might
have manufactured an entire mockup of the non-nuclear shell of a nuclear
explosive, while continuing to observe its safeguards obligations on all
nuclear material.� It would be folly for NPT parties to fail to act in
such circumstances.� Whether or not there has been a safeguards violation
under Article III, it is also important to determine whether all the facts
of a case tend to point toward an intent to manufacture or acquire nuclear
weapons.� Facts indicating that the purpose of such an activity is the
acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show noncompliance
with Article II.� Examples of activities of concern include: seeking
certain fuel cycle facilities of direct relevance to nuclear weapons, such
as enrichment or reprocessing, with no clear economic or peaceful
justification; clandestine facilities and procurements; committing
safeguards violations and failing to cooperation with the IAEA to remedy
them; and using denial and deception tactics to conceal nuclear-related
activities.

Some might ask how the pursuit of enrichment or reprocessing without an
economic justification can be an indicator of a possible Article II
violation.� Iran provides a case in point.� Iran sought to acquire an
enrichment program in secret and in violation of its safeguards
obligations under the NPT.�� In light of the willingness of another state
to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor and any future reactor, Iran's
enrichment program has no conceivable civil purpose.� Moreover, Iran's
uranium reserves are too small to provide an independent fuel supply for
its nuclear power program, but large enough to support a weapons program.�
Why, then, has the Iranian regime been pursuing enrichment, and why has it
done so clandestinely for almost two decades?� It is painfully clear that
Iran has not made the strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability.� It is determined to acquire an enrichment
plant to give itself the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, which
it could pursue either through further violation of or withdrawal from the
NPT.� These factors have led the United States to conclude that the intent
of these activities is the manufacture of nuclear weapons and that Iran is
in violation of Article II.

We must adapt NPT enforcement to today's challenges.� We have an
obligation to each other under the NPT to keep this collective security
arrangement strong for the indefinite future.� If we are to thwart the
strategies of those who would violate the NPT, we must do more to ensure
that our companies and citizens are not contributing to proliferation.� We
must make clear that there will be significant consequences if any NPT
party strays from its nonproliferation obligations.� And we must be
prepared to take action if there is noncompliance and to do so at an early
stage.� If we wait too long, it will be more difficult to dissuade the
proliferator and we will have less time to do so.

The NPT should be an essential element of international efforts to
create a global environment hostile to the spread of WMD.� The NPT should
be critical for global safety and security.� However, the NPT will lose
much of its effectiveness unless NPT parties are strongly committed to
compliance with the Treaty nonproliferation undertakings and to strong
action against those who are not.

(end text)