040329 原子力発電所へのテロ攻撃と使用済み燃料の一時的貯蔵方法: NASとNRCの意見対立
度々お伝えしておりますように、現在米国で最も恐れられていることは、9.11タイプの核テロ攻撃(原子力施設へのテロ攻撃を含む)が行われることですが、とくに原子力発電所が狙われ、使用済み燃料を一時貯蔵しているプールが破壊された場合には大変なことになる危険性があるので、使用済み燃料をなるべく早くプールから取り出して乾式貯蔵用キャスクに入れて保管すべきであるーーとする内容の報告書が全米科学アカデミー(NAS)によりまとめられました。この報告書は9.11以後かかる危険性を懸念する議会の求めによってまとめられたものですが、この報告書を連邦政府の原子力規制委員会(NRC)から議会に送付する3月14日付け書簡の中で、NRCは、「大量の使用済み燃料を乾式貯蔵方式で保管するのはテロ対策として効果があるか疑わしいし、金がかかりすぎるから不必要である」とのコメントをつけていたことが明らかになり、ワシントンで問題になっている模様です。この報告書自体は、NRCの判断ではテログループに知られては困る情報を含んでいるとの理由で最近まで不公表になっていたもので、現在も大部分が秘密のままですが、NAS側では、「NRCの説明は国民に真実を伝えておらず、誤解を与えるものである」として強く批判している由。
原子力発電所関係の情報をテロ対策上どこまで公表すべきなのか、不用意にすべてを公表すれば市民に多大の不安を感じさせる一方、テログループにとって有益な情報を与えることになるわけで、この辺が難しい問題となっているわけです。他方、全米の103基の原子炉から出た膨大な量の使用済み燃料は、ネヴァダ州のヤッカマウンテン地層処分場に運び込まれる予定ですが、肝心のヤッカマウンテン計画が地元の反対や訴訟続きで実現が延び延びとなってなっているため、連邦政府としても動きが取れないという苦しい状況がしばらく続きそうです。詳細は以下のWashington
Post記事でどうぞ。
--KK
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Storage of Nuclear Spent Fuel Criticized
Science Academy Study Points to Risk of Attack
By Shankar Vedantam
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, March 28, 2005; Page A01
A classified report by nuclear experts assembled by the National
Academy of Sciences has challenged the decision by federal regulators to allow
commercial nuclear facilities to store large quantities of radioactive spent
fuel in pools of water.
The report concluded that the government does not fully understand the
risks that a terrorist attack could pose to the pools and ought to expedite the
removal of the fuel to dry storage casks that are more resilient to attack. The
Bush administration has long defended the safety of the pools, and the nuclear
industry has warned that moving large amounts of fuel to dry storage would be
unnecessary and very expensive.
The report was requested by Congress after the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001, as homeland security officials sought to understand the
potential consequences of a Sept. 11-scale attack on a nuclear facility.
Because the report is classified, its contents were not made public
when it was delivered to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) last summer.
Even a stripped-down, declassified version has remained under wraps since
November because the commission says it contains sensitive information.
However, the commission made excerpts of the report public when
Chairman Nils Diaz sent a letter to Congress on March 14 rebutting some of the
academy's concerns. His letter also suggested that the academy had largely
backed the government's views about the safety of existing fuel storage
systems.
E. William Colglazier, executive officer of the academy, said the
letter was misleading and warned that the public needs to learn about the
report's findings.
"There are substantive disagreements between our committee's views and
the NRC," he said in an interview. "If someone only reads the NRC report, they
would not get a full picture of what we had to say."
Although the commission said it is keeping the report under wraps for
security reasons, some officials who have seen the document suggest that the NRC
is merely suppressing embarrassing criticism.
"At the same time that the NRC is saying that the National Academy's
study is classified and not releasable to the public, it has somehow managed to
send a detailed rebuttal of the report's conclusions to Congress in unclassified
form," said Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), who has seen the report.
"I am concerned that the totality of the Commission's actions reflect a
systemic effort to withhold important information from . . . the public, rather
than a genuine effort to be protective of national security," Markey said in a
March 21 letter to the commission's inspector general.
NRC spokesman Eliot Brenner countered that the commission is "a very
open agency" and that regulators are working with the academy to make the report
public.
"Our core concern is making sure that information that could reasonably
be expected to be available to a terrorist is not publicly available," he said.
"We are continuing to work with them on finding the right balance."
The report was solicited by Congress to study how best to store spent
nuclear fuel -- tons of rods containing radioactive byproducts of nuclear
fission reactions are produced each year by the nation's 103
electricity-generating nuclear reactors. Spent fuel rods generate intense heat
and dangerous long-term radiation that must be contained.
Most of the spent rods are stored in large
swimming-pool-like structures called spent fuel pools, said David Lochbaum, a
nuclear safety engineer at the science and advocacy group Union of Concerned
Scientists, who has worked at several plants. The pools are about 45 feet deep
and 40 feet square and are filled with about 100,000 gallons of circulating
water to remove heat and serve as a radiation shield, he said.
After cooling for about five
years, the rods can be moved to dry storage -- heavy casks of lead and steel.
But the casks are expensive, and commercial reactors have elected to leave the
rods in the pools until the pools fill up. Lochbaum said some pools hold 800 to
1,000 tons of rods. In the event of a terrorist strike, Lochbaum said, the dry
casks would be much safer, because explosions could drain the pools and set off
fire and radiation hazards.
The nuclear industry wants the fuel moved to a storage
site in Nevada, but that project has long been plagued by delays and opposition.
Steven Kraft, director of waste management at the Nuclear Energy Institute, an
industry group, said studies had shown that the pools are as safe as the dry
casks -- the same position adopted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kraft said that the risk of catastrophic attacks is
minuscule and that modeling analyses have shown that even plane crashes are
unlikely to affect the pools' integrity. And even if they did cause damage, he
added, there would not be catastrophic consequences because of safety systems
already in place.
"If the pool is safe and the casks are safe and they both
meet the requirements, there is no justification for going through what is a
huge amount of expense and worker exposure" to move the rods to dry storage, he
said.
In his letter to Congress, Diaz said the academy's
recommendation to move fuel to dry storage was based on "scenarios that were
unreasonable."
But Arjun Makhijani, a nuclear engineer with the Institute
for Energy and Environmental Research, a nonprofit research and advocacy
organization that supports underground dry storage of the rods, said the
commission had been lax.
"There is no question that any terrorist who wants to know
about spent fuel has plenty of information already," he said of the
withheld report. "Publication of a report on security will not help terrorists.
The only thing it is hindering is discussion of public safety."
Diaz's letter to Congress shows that the academy recommended that the
government conduct additional analyses to evaluate "the vulnerabilities and
consequences" to storage pools of "attacks using large aircraft or large
explosives." The academy also called for a review and upgrade of security
measures to prevent theft of spent fuel rods by insiders and an assessment of
security by "an independent organization."
The commission letter defended measures it has in place and said that
"the likelihood an adversary could steal spent fuel . . . is extremely low." The
letter said the additional analysis demanded by the academy study was "more than
is needed" and rejected the call for an independent security analysis, saying
the commission's own assessments were "sound and realistic."
To keep the report secret, the federal agency used a classification
called "Safeguards Information" that it applies to data that are unclassified
but reveal sensitive details about nuclear facilities and security procedures.
Brenner, the spokesman, emphasized that the academy's report and the
commission's response had been seen by the Department of Homeland Security and
members of Congress charged with oversight. "The full report is there with those
with the appropriate clearances," he said.
The academy's Colglazier said the science organization had produced
many classified reports but had never encountered such hurdles in creating a
public version.
"We don't want to provide information in our report that could be used
by terrorists to exploit vulnerabilities," he said. "But we also want the public
and decision makers to know what things need to be addressed."
The scientist also rejected Brenner's reassurance that the classified
report had been seen by relevant decision makers. Governors of states with
nuclear plants need to see the report, he said, and the public had an important
role as well.
"The way our political system works, when politicians
hear from their constituents, they are motivated to take action that they don't
when the public is unaware," he said.