Keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists begins with every
nation accepting its responsibilities as a sovereign state to exercise
trade and border controls or regulation of nuclear materials and
facilities in line with international nonproliferation regimes, Ambassador
Linton Brooks said March 16.

Prevention of nuclear terrorism and traditional nonproliferation
programs form two halves of the same walnut,・Brooks said. We cannot
treat them as separate enterprises.・

The ambassador, speaking to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Conference on Nuclear Security in London, said an integrated strategy
which combines conventional anti-terror activities, such a securing
nuclear material, with a strengthened regime is needed.

Brooks is the administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration.

An approach that rests on the principle of sovereign responsibility will
work best when nonproliferation regimes are strong,・he stated.
Regrettably the patchwork of treaties, arrangements, and state
obligations that form the nonproliferation regime are facing serious
challenges.・

Brooks laid out four proposals President Bush made in February to
"translate into action" the existing international consensus that
proliferation cannot be tolerated and must be stopped to avoid
catastrophic nuclear terrorism:

-- Expanded efforts to secure high-risk materials, including stopping the
further production of fissile material usable in weapons;

-- Scrupulous compliance with international nonproliferation efforts,
whether under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA safeguards,
international nuclear and radiological conventions, or the new U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540 which calls on all states to act
cooperatively to prevent illicit trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and related materials;

-- Preservation of the integrity of the NPT and IAEA safeguards through
full enforcement, toward which President Bush has called for the creation
of a special IAEA verification committee; and

-- A halt to the proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technology.


Unfortunately, Brooks explained, the NPT's right to peaceful nuclear
cooperation (Article IV) makes no distinction between sensitive fuel cycle
and other nuclear technologies. Recognizing this risk, President Bush last
year proposed that supplier nations refrain from transferring enrichment
and reprocessing technologies to states that did not already possess
full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.・

In relation to these proposals, Brooks spoke of the importance of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a program in which the United
State and many other countries participate to share information and, under
national and international laws, seize illegal shipments of weapons of
mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials that pass
through their own or international travel lanes.

Knowing what we now know about the sophistication of the nuclear black
market,・he said, if trade controls fail, then countering proliferation
through the interdiction of trade is clearly needed.・

The ambassador urged all signatories to the NPT to complete the required
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, build the infrastructure necessary to
control exports and monitor borders for illicit trade in WMD, and work
cooperatively to combat nuclear threats.

Nonproliferation institutions express the will of their members,・Brooks
said. If we are dissatisfied with regime performance, then the burden
falls on us -- the peaceful, cooperative governments -- to correct
deficiencies and demand redress, including earlier intervention by the
United Nations Security Council, from those who violate their treaty and
international safeguards obligations.・

The three-day conference, which ended March 18, was attended by
representatives of 76 countries. The United Kingdom, as a consequence of
holding the presidency of the Group of Eight nations (G8) in 2005, served
as host for this event.

The G8 include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
the United States and Russia.

Following is the transcript of Brooks・remarks:

(begin text)

Remarks, as delivered, by Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security
16 March 2005
London, England

  Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Towards an Integrative Approach

  <u>Introduction

  Let me thank the organizers, in particular the United Kingdom and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for hosting a conference on a
concern -- nuclear terrorism -- of such transcendent importance.

  Today, the threat of nuclear terrorism is in the center of the U.S. and
international security agenda.  It was not always so.� Only after the
September 11th terrorist attacks and subsequent attacks around the world
has the international community mobilized to confront the specter of
terrorists armed with mass destruction weapons.

  We can all take pride in the important work and steps taken to address
nuclear terrorism in the four years since September 11th.� Progress is
underway to improve security of nuclear and radioactive materials, to
update anti-terror norms and controls over nuclear technologies, and to
heighten awareness of dangers arising from nuclear terrorism, thanks in
part to conferences like this.

  As impressive as these gains may be, far more remains to be done to keep
nuclear and radiological weapons out of the hands of terrorists and states
that sponsor them.� A useful step forward would be to move towards an
integrated strategy that joins more conventional anti-nuclear terror
activities - i.e., securing nuclear and radioactive assets against theft
and sabotage - with efforts to strengthen the core of the nonproliferation
regime - i.e., safeguards, physical protection, export controls and
strengthened treaty regimes - to prevent terrorist acquisition or
brokering in WMD technologies.� Prevention of nuclear terrorism and
traditional nonproliferation programs form two halves of the same walnut;
we cannot treat them as separate enterprises.

  <u>Sovereign Responsibility: A Starting Point

  The fight against nuclear terrorism must involve all states.
Opportunities for terrorists and their supporters to access weapons
capabilities are expanding beyond national borders, as illustrated by the
A.Q. Khan network and its ability to manufacture components off-shore and
move weapons-related technology to clandestine end-users.

  This panel is to address lessons for the future, the first one is that
as a matter of principle, unless all states acceptsovereign responsibility
over activities under their jurisdiction and control -- whether that is
trade and border controls or regulation of nuclear materials or nuclear
facilities that are in conformance with international regimes -- we risk
some future, catastrophic act of nuclear terror.� This is a future that we
have a collective responsibility to avoid.

  <u>The President's Nonproliferation Initiatives

  An approach that rests on the principle of sovereign responsibility will
work best when nonproliferation regimes are strong.� Regrettably, the
patchwork of treaties, arrangements, and state obligations that form the
nonproliferation regime are facing serious challenges.

  Last February, President Bush highlighted nuclear proliferation dangers
and called on the international community to "translate into action" the
consensus that proliferation cannot be tolerated and must be stopped.� Let
me group the President's proposals into four imperatives and comment
briefly on each.

  First, efforts to secure high-risk materials must be expanded.� This is
an important area of work for the United States and our G8 and other
partners.� Cooperation with Russia, given its vast stores of
weapons-suitable material, is naturally a first-order priority.� Our
strategy to ensure the security of weapons material has five core
elements:

  -- Stopping the further production of fissile material usable in
weapons;

  -- Consolidating high-risk material and repatriating fresh and spent HEU
[highly-enriched uranium] from research reactors;

  -- Protecting vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials by
accelerating security upgrades and deploying detection systems at
strategic transit points worldwide;

  -- Eliminating excess weapons-grade plutonium, continuing to down blend
excess HEU for commercial power and, to the extent possible, ending the
use of HEU in civil nuclear applications; and

  -- Ensuring that sustainable national nuclear regulatory programs are in
place to keep nuclear materials and facilities under proper control.

  This cooperation has yielded tremendous progress in recent years,
protecting or eliminating fissile material equivalent to many hundreds of
nuclear weapons.

  Newer initiatives like the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative are
moving forward to build international support for national efforts to
identify, secure, recover, and facilitate the disposition of nuclear and
radioactive materials of possible interest to terrorists.� Since last
September, this initiative has repatriated fresh HEU fuel from Uzbekistan
and the Czech Republic to Russia, initiated regional training programs,
and initiated more than 10 other joint projects.

  As the two largest nuclear states, a special burden falls on the United
States and Russia to keep nuclear and radioactive materials out of the
hands of terrorists.� Cooperation with Russia on nuclear security will
remain a priority for the United States.� Cooperative programs have wide
support, are well funded, and are a regular discussion item between the
U.S. and Russian governments, as was indicated by the recent Joint
Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation at the Bush-Putin meeting in
Bratislava.� An important and growing element of our cooperation is to
exchange best practices, first with one another and subsequently with all
states and with the IAEA.� No matter how good a security system is, there
is always something to learn in exchanges with other professionals.

  The United States is not advocating measures for others that it is
unwilling to accept for itself.� We are tightening regulatory controls and
have dramatically improved our internal security posture.� We have
installed additional protective barriers external to facilities, and
upgraded existing barriers for increased strengthening.� Our perimeter
alarm systems have been enhanced to counter the increased threat, and we
have strengthened security to protect sensitive shipments.� Facility
access controls for employees and visitors to our facilities have been
upgraded, and we have enhanced our protective forces training to focus on
tactical training to oppose terrorists.� We take this threat very
seriously.

  Second, states must scrupulously comply with international
nonproliferation undertakings, whether under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), IAEA safeguards, international nuclear and radiological
conventions, or the new UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

  The NPT requires that all states complete a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA; yet more than 30 Treaty states have yet to do so.� Many fewer
states have signed, much less ratified the Additional Protocol to IAEA
safeguards or have the infrastructure to control exports or monitor
borders for illicit, WMD-related trade.� This lucrative opportunity to
potential proliferators must be eliminated.� I am proud of the leadership
my government has shown in signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol,
which, as the President has recommended, must become a new universal
standard for nonproliferation.

  Knowing what we now know about the sophistication of the nuclear black
market, if trade controls fail then countering proliferation through the
interdiction of trade is clearly needed.� This is the purpose of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by the United States and
others in 2003 to promote interdiction principles, share information and
conduct operational exercises.� Resolution 1540 and PSI come together in
an important respect:� in order for interdiction to succeed, states must
have the legal basis and means both to identify and hold seized trade.

  The global reach of the A.Q. Khan network was telling in this regard.�
Consider the report of the Malaysian Inspector-General of Police
concerning the involvement of a Malaysian company in the Libyan nuclear
procurement ring.� According to this report, nuclear specialists within
Malaysia were unable to identify controlled components as those that might
contribute to Libya's uranium enrichment program.� This experience was
repeated in other countries, and suggests that unless states take
seriously their domestic responsibilities to control activities under
their jurisdiction, the gaps exploited by the Khan network will continue
to be open to tomorrow's proliferators and terrorists.

  In addition to greater vigilance by states, targeted and coordinated
programs of assistance are also needed. The United States promotes
cooperative exchange programs on export control, border security, and
physical protection to redress these implementation gaps.� The programs
have expanded in recent years to include more than 50 countries in every
major region of the world.

  The international community must also consider how it can respond to
states that take the responsible course of abandoning weapons of mass
destruction.� The United States recently expanded efforts to redirect
former Soviet weapons scientists towards peaceful commercial employment to
include Libyan and Iraqi scientists.� These efforts are needed to prevent
leakage of WMD know-how, but they also aid states that have turned away
from the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction to build their economies
and science and technology base.

  More could be done to improve coordination of international outreach
programs, including use of the IAEA and Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to inform members of 1540 requirements and
facilitate training activities or elaborate "codes of conduct" and "best
practices" for industry and nuclear users.

  Third, the integrity of the NPT and IAEA safeguards must be preserved,
especially in regions linked to terrorism, religious extremism, and long
histories of armed conflict.� Though the articles of the NPT and the
original IAEA safeguards agreement were drawn up years ago, they remain
relevant in today's world.� Our goal must be to ensure that these
arrangements are strengthened, complied with, and fully enforced.

  Some argue that proliferation in North Korea, Iran, and, before it
recanted, Libya, tell the troubling story of an NPT too outdated or
weakened to blunt nuclear proliferation.� The United States believes this
critique is misplaced.� Nonproliferation institutions express the will of
their members.� If we are dissatisfied with regime performance, then the
burden falls on us -- the peaceful, cooperative governments -- to correct
deficiencies and demand redress, including earlier intervention by the
United Nations Security Council, from those who violate their treaty and
international safeguards obligations.

  To brace IAEA safeguards, President Bush has called for the creation of
a special IAEA verification committee to monitor and enforce compliance
with nuclear nonproliferation obligations.� Terms of reference for this
committee are now under consideration by the IAEA's Board of Governors.�
We look forward to examining ways in which IAEA verification authorities
can be improved or even expanded.� Equally encouraging is the creation of
new units within the IAEA to review commercial satellite imagery and
monitor foreign procurements.� To the extent these new capabilities
provide the IAEA with earlier warning of evasive activities, they should
be a welcome addition to IAEA safeguards and our common nonproliferation
and anti-nuclear terror goals.

  For safeguards and global security measures to be fully effective, we
need full implementation of new instruments that address nuclear terror.�
The United States was a strong proponent of efforts last year to complete
new Export/Import Guidance for the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources.� Implementation of this Guidance is
essential for controlling beneficial civilian devices when exported from
one country to another and for preventing their theft or use in malicious
acts, such as detonation of a dirty bomb.� This year, we hope for similar
success to update the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material.� The Code and Convention are integral parts in the prevention of
nuclear and radiological terrorism, and we will work with others to ensure
these instruments are universally applied.

  President Bush and the other G8 leaders urged all states to implement
the revised Code of Conduct and recognize it as a global standard at the
Sea Island Summit last year.� We call upon all Member States to apply the
revised Code of Conduct to prevent diversion of sources and acts of
radiological terrorism.

  Fourth, the proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technology must
be stopped.� While terrorist acquisition of an enrichment plant is a low
risk, the continuing spread of sensitive nuclear technologies can only
create greater opportunities for sub-state actors to acquire weapons
materials.� Libya, Iran, and North Korea all to one degree or another
benefited from the illicit acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing
technologies.� Unfortunately, the NPT's right to peaceful nuclear
cooperation (Article IV) makes no distinction between sensitive fuel cycle
and other nuclear technologies.

  Recognizing this risk, President Bush last year proposed that supplier
nations refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies
to states that did not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment
and reprocessing plants.� The Nuclear Suppliers Group and G8 nations
continue to examine this proposal, as well as others that would establish
solid eligibility criteria for receipt of such transfers and make the
Additional Protocol a new condition of peaceful nuclear trade.

  <u>Conclusion

  At the opening of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein warned that the
advent of nuclear fission had changed everything except the way we think,
and thus we drift towards disaster.� Einstein's world of one or two
masters of nuclear technology was far different from the one we live in
today, in which nuclear science and materials are widely spread, but the
risk of disaster remains.� Nuclear security in today's age of terrorism
requires global participation, not just by national governments, but also
by police forces, border guards, cities, communities, harbors, research
institutes, and factories.

  With a concerted and action-oriented approach to combat nuclear
proliferation threats, one that involves the cooperation and input of
nations and respect for international agreements, norms, and standards,
the United States is convinced that the consensus against proliferation
will, as President Bush suggested, be "translated into action."

  Thank you for your attention.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
NNNN