050316 　「中国はもっと北朝鮮に圧力をかけるべきだ」：　DeTrani議会証言

China should be doing more to bring North Korea back to talks aimed at
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, says Joseph DeTrani, President Bush's
special envoy to the Six-Party Talks that include North and South Korea,
Japan, China, Russia and the United States.

"We believe that China can do even more to bring its full influence, not
just to persuade North Korea to return to the Talks as soon as possible,
but to commit to comprehensive denuclearization," he told the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations March 15, during his confirmation hearing
to receive the rank of ambassador.

President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "have made it clear
that the U.S. wants a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the North Korea
nuclear issue," he said. "Our hope is North Korea will see the value in
giving up its nuclear programs. It's a path that would benefit greatly
North Korea and its 23 million people."

DeTrani, in addition to being the President's Special Envoy for the
Six-Party Talks, is the U.S. Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), which was formed to help North Korea meet
its energy needs in return for dismantling its nuclear facilities.

Prior to joining the Department of State, DeTrani worked for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) for 30 years, dealing with North Korean issues
and serving as chief of East Asian operations.

Following is the text of DeTrani's remarks:

(begin text)

Confirmation Hearing Statement
By Joseph R. DeTrani
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
March 15, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it's a great honor to appear
before you today as President Bush's nominee for the rank of Ambassador
during my tenure as Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks with the DPRK
and as the United States Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO). Since November 2003, I have been working
as the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks. My counterparts from the
DPRK, China, Japan and South Korea all have the rank of Ambassador, thus
the decision to nominate me for the rank of Ambassador during my tenure is
a clear message from the President of his resolve to solve the North Korea
nuclear issue through negotiations.

Prior to joining the State Department, I worked at the CIA for over thirty
years. Half of that time was in assignments overseas, mainly in East Asia
and China. My most recent assignments at CIA were as Chief of East Asian
Operations and before that, as Director of the Crime and Narcotics Center.
I've worked North Korean issues for most of my professional career at CIA.
Mr. Chairman, I'm grateful to the President and the Secretary of State for
nominating me for this position and allowing me to continue to serve my
country. It is truly a great honor.

I believe my professional experience has prepared me for this important
undertaking. During the past sixteen months, I have had a very close and
substantive relationship with the Committee's professional staff. Indeed,
the hearings I've had with the Committee in July 2004 and February 2005
were highlights of my tenure in this position. And as you know, Mr.
Chairman, during this period we have had three Six-Party Plenary and two
Six-Party Working Group sessions with the DPRK. At the June 2004 Plenary
session, the U.S. submitted a proposal for the resolution of the nuclear
issue with North Korea. This was a substantive proposal, discussed
initially with South Korea and Japan and briefed to China and Russia. It
called on North Korea to dismantle its plutonium and uranium enrichment
programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, in exchange
for multilateral security assurances, a plan to address North Korea's
non-nuclear energy needs, discussion of the steps required for removal
from the list of states that support terrorism and discussion of steps
necessary to lift remaining economic sanctions, and technical and
financial assistance with the disablement and dismantlement process,
including retraining. Following the initial preparatory period for
dismantlement and removal, the Parties would complete the remaining steps
to accomplish the full elimination and removal of all DPRK nuclear
programs. The Parties would address remaining issues that are obstacles to
the normalization of diplomatic relations and to economic cooperation
between the DPRK and the international community. A Working Group session
in August 2004, followed by a Plenary session in September 2004 were
scheduled, but unfortunately the DPRK decided not to attend these
sessions, claiming that the U.S.'s so-called hostile policy made it
impossible for them to attend at that time. During each of our Six-Party
Plenary and Working Group sessions the U.S. has had direct, private
discussions with the DPRK. Additionally, we met with the DPRK Permanent
Representative to the U.N., most recently on 31 August, 30 November and 3
December 2004, to request that the DPRK return to the Talks as soon as
possible, with no pre-conditions. The DPRK was told that the U.S. was
prepared to discuss our June 2004 proposal. The DPRK claims that they will
return to the Talks only when the atmosphere has improved.

The U.S. is working closely with China, Japan, South Korea and Russia on
this issue. We have had five trilateral meetings with our allies, Japan
and South Korea; the most recent meeting was late last month. There has
been a special focus on China. We believe that China can do even more to
bring its full influence not just to persuade North Korea to return to the
Talks as soon as possible, but to commit to comprehensive
denuclearization.

The President and Secretary of State have made it clear that the U.S.
wants a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the North Korea nuclear issue.
Our hope is North Korea will see the value in giving up its nuclear
programs. It's a path that would benefit greatly North Korea and its 23
million people.

Mr. Chairman, it's an honor working this critically important issue. If
confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Congress and the
interagency group in carrying out the President's instructions in dealing
with North Korea and to represent our interests in KEDO matters. I look
forward to continued close consultations with the Committee.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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