050305 　核の脅威なくす課題を提言：　米カーネギー国際平和財団の報告書：　そのポイントと評価、特にインド問題（金子）　　＜重要＞

 

 

報告書の中で特に注目すべき点は、�@追加的な国による濃縮・再処理施設の取得の禁止せよ、�A高濃縮ウランの製造禁止とプルトニウム分離の一時的停止(temporary pause)を実施せよ、�BＮＰＴから脱退する国については、加盟国であった間に犯した同条約義務違反を国連安保理が追及することを決議せよ、�C脱退する国については、脱退前に海外から取得（輸入）した核物質、資材等を使わせないようにする法的措置を講じよ、�Dインド、パキスタン、イスラエル（いずれも「事実上の核兵器国」）についてはＮＰＴに加盟していなくても、ＮＰＴ上で核兵器国（米、露、英、仏、中）が負っているのと同じ核不拡散義務を受け入れることを約束させよ。その代わり、右３カ国は、周辺地域の安全と全世界的な核軍縮の進展がない間は各自の核兵器を放棄しなくてもよいと国際的に認めてやる。�E右３カ国に対しては、核物質管理と原子炉の安全の面で協力してやれ。但し新規の原子炉の輸出規制措置は維持するべし。

 

 

 

◆核の脅威なくす課題を提言　米カーネギー国際平和財団

　　　　（朝日新聞　2005年03月04日) 

　米カーネギー国際平和財団は３日、核の脅威をなくすため、国際社会が取り組むべき具体的な課題をまとめた報告書を発表した。核保有国に対して新型核兵器の開発中止や核兵器の削減を求めたほか、「核兵器使用の引き金となりうる」として地域紛争の解決も急務だと提言している。
　同財団の最高幹部を含む５人が、米ロや日本、欧州諸国など２０カ国の政府関係者や専門家の意見を聴いてまとめた。
　報告書は核保有国に対し、核実験の再開を断念するとともに、新たな核兵器の開発をしないよう求め、「核軍縮にむけた具体的な日程表を示すべきだ」と促した。
　また、インドやパキスタン、イスラエルを例に挙げ、こうした国々と周辺国の地域的な緊張の高まりが核開発競争に拍車をかける恐れがあると強調。「（米ロなど）有力な核保有国は、外交的な努力で地域の緊張緩和に努めなければならない」と求めている。


この報告書については、下記のアドレスからアクセスできます。
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16593

全体では２００ページ以上あります。概要は以下のようなことだそうです。

Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security

By George Perkovich , Jessica Tuchman Mathews , Joseph Cirincione , Rose Gottemoeller , Jon Wolfsthal 
Report, March 2005 

"By far the most comprehensive, the most creative, the most useful analysis and prescription I have ever seen…superb."
--Robert Gallucci, Dean, Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service


Summary
A team of leading nonproliferation experts offers a blueprint for rethinking the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. They offer a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and missile materials through a twenty step, priority action agenda.

This is the final version of a report released in June 2004 for worldwide review. The authors consulted with experts and officials in the United States and twenty countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the former Soviet states, and Russia.

The final report captures the varying national interests driving nonproliferation policies?critical knowledge if the United States’ strategy is to win international support. Local commitments already have been made, prepublication, to translate the strategy into Arabic, Chinese, and Russian, and to distribute it in India.

About the Authors

George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Jessica T. Mathews is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Joseph Cirincione is a senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation Project. Rose Gottemoeller is a senior associate conducting research jointly for the Russian and Eurasian Program and the Global Policy Program. Jon B. Wolfsthal is associate and deputy director for the Non-Proliferation Project. 


--------------------------------------------------------------

The Priority Action Agenda
Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security

In March 2005, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released Universal Compliance: A
Strategy for Nuclear Security, a new blueprint for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Initially released in June 2004 for worldwide review, the new, final report incorporates input from experts and
officials in the United States and 20 countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the former Soviet States,
and Russia. The final report captures the varying national interests driving non-proliferation policies―critical
knowledge if the United States’ strategy is to win international support. The entire report is available at
www.CarnegieEndowment.org/strategy.

An effective strategy for nuclear security will require universal compliance with the norms and
rules of a toughened nuclear nonproliferation regime. Compliance means more than declarations
of good intent―it means actual performance. Universal means that nonproliferation norms
and rules must be extended not only to treaty members, but also to all states and to nonstate
actors.
Six obligations form the core of the universal compliance strategy. Together, they form a
balance of obligations among the nuclear and non-nuclear states, and erect a defense-in-depth
against the spread of nuclear weapons. Nearly one hundred policy recommendations flow
from these obligations, of which twenty form the priority action agenda.

OBLIGATION ONE: Make Nonproliferation Irreversible. Radically revise the rules managing
the production of fissile material; clarify and tighten the terms by which states can withdraw from the NPT.
1. Preclude acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants by any additional
state.
2. Provide, in return, internationally guaranteed, economically attractive supplies of the fuel and
services necessary to meet nuclear energy demands.
3. End the production of highly enriched uranium worldwide and adopt a temporary “pause” in the
separation of plutonium.
4. Pass a new UN Security Council resolution making a state that withdraws from the NPT
responsible for violations committed while it was still a party to the treaty.
5. Bar states withdrawing from the treaty from legally using nuclear assets acquired from abroad
before their withdrawal.
6. Suspend nuclear cooperation with countries that the IAEA cannot certify are in full compliance
with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

OBLIGATION TWO: Devalue the Political and Military Currency of Nuclear
Weapons. All states must diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and international politics.
The nuclear weapon states must do more to make their nonproliferation commitments irreversible, especially
through the steady, verified dismantlement of nuclear arsenals.
7. Disavow the development of new types of nuclear weapons, reaffirm the current moratorium on
nuclear weapon testing, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
8. Lengthen the time decision makers would have before deciding to launch nuclear weapons by
taking missiles off hair-trigger alert.
9. Make nuclear weapons reductions, such as those required under the 2002 Treaty of Moscow,
irreversible and verifiable.
10. Produce a detailed road map of the steps that would be necessary to verifiably eliminate nuclear
arsenals in order to clarify whether or not disarmament is possible.

OBLIGATION THREE: Secure All Nuclear Materials. All states must maintain robust
standards for securing, monitoring, and accounting for fissile materials in any form―to prevent nuclear
terrorism and to create the potential for secure nuclear disarmament.
11. Convene a high-level “Contact Group to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism” to establish a global
standard for protecting weapons, materials, and facilities.
12. Identify, secure, and remove nuclear materials from all vulnerable sites within four years―an
accelerated “Global Cleanout.”

OBLIGATION FOUR: Stop Illegal Transfers. States must establish enforceable prohibitions
against efforts by individuals, corporations, and states to assist others in secretly acquiring the technology,
material, and know-how for nuclear weapons.
13. Establish and enforce national legislation implementing UN Resolution 1540 to secure nuclear
materials, strengthen export controls, and criminalize illicit trade.
14. Make the IAEA’s Additional Protocol a mandatory condition for all transfers by members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
15. Expand the voluntary data-sharing between members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the
IAEA and make it obligatory for transfer of controlled items.
16. Develop with corporations and banks voluntary actions to block trade, loan, and investment
activity that would advance the illegal acquisition of nuclear capabilities.
17. Ground the Proliferation Security Initiative in international law and widen it to cover
international waterways and airspace.

OBLIGATION FIVE: Commit to Conflict Resolution. Proliferation cannot be solved by
nonproliferation measures alone.
18. Concentrate the diplomatic influence of the major powers on resolving the regional conflicts that
underlie some states’ pursuit of security though nuclear weapons.

OBLIGATION SIX: Solve the Three-State Problem. Persuade India, Israel, and Pakistan to
accept the same nonproliferation obligations accepted by the weapon state signatories to the NPT.
19. In return for international recognition that India, Israel, and Pakistan will not give up their
nuclear weapons absent durable regional peace and progress toward global nuclear disarmament,
the three states should accept all of the nonproliferation-related obligations accepted by the five
original nuclear weapon states.
20. Cooperate with India, Israel, and Pakistan on nuclear material security and reactor safety, but
maintain trade restrictions on new reactors.

The Authors
The five authors have more than 100 years of combined experience in international security.
They have held senior positions in the U.S. Congress, the White House, and other U.S.
government agencies. George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; Jessica Mathews is president; Joseph Cirincione is a
senior associate; Rose Gottemoeller is a senior associate; and Jon B. Wolfsthal is an
associate.