IF NORTH KOREA'S declaration of itself as a nuclear power was intended,
as it seems to have been, to shock the world and thereby pressure the United
States into making unwarranted concessions, then the Bush administration
responded well by playing it down. The erratic Pyongyang regime, officials
pointed out, has made similar statements before. U.S. intelligence has credited
the North with a couple of bombs for a decade, and in the absence of a nuclear
test, there's no way to know whether it has workable warheads. The
administration is also right to dismiss, again, North Korea's attempt to insist
on bilateral negotiations with the United States. The Bush administration's
recruitment of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia for "six-party" talks was
its sole success on the Korean front in the past four years and should be
preserved. The latest declaration nevertheless underlined the distressing truth
that as the threat from North Korea grows steadily worse, the administration
lacks an effective strategy to counter it.
One symptom of the problem is that the latest North Korean move took
Washington and its allies by surprise. They had expected the regime of Kim Jong
Il to grudgingly agree to a new round of the six-party talks next month. It's
possible, even probable, that the North wants to avoid delivering the answers it
would be asked for at those talks. These include its response to an
eight-month-old U.S. offer of political and economic concessions following the
disclosure of its nuclear facilities, and an explanation of evidence, recently
supplied by a U.S. envoy to the Asian governments, that North Korea supplied
Libya with uranium suitable for processing into bomb material. Unsatisfactory
answers by Pyongyang would risk alienating not only the Bush administration --
which anyway may not be willing to strike a deal with Mr. Kim -- but China and
South Korea, which have the ability to strangle the North by cutting off
supplies of food and energy or even to cause its collapse by opening their
borders to refugees.
North Korea has been trying, with some success, to convince its
neighbors that the United States is the obstacle to progress because of its
refusal to offer the North greater concessions. The Bush administration, in
turn, hopes to convince the Chinese and South Koreans that Pyongyang will never
yield its nukes without far greater external pressure -- pressure that only
those countries, or the U.N. Security Council, can effectively apply. In fact, a
diplomatic success is hard to imagine without a little of both: more determined
action by North Korea's neighbors and an unambiguous decision by the Bush
administration to settle for detente with the North, rather than regime
change.
Neither development seems likely. The Chinese leadership of Hu Jintao
appears far more concerned with suppressing any hint of political change at home
than promoting it in North Korea. The leftist South Korean government,
meanwhile, clings to a strategy of subsidizing Mr. Kim. Bush administration
hard-liners brandish the North's latest manifesto as proof that negotiations are
a waste of time.
Meanwhile, according to U.S. intelligence estimates,
North Korea probably continues to build weapons and process nuclear material. It
may be looking beyond Libya for new customers for such products. Maybe there is
no way to neutralize this threat, but the Bush administration needs to rethink
its own failing policy.