050103 Re: 「韓日の核武装を許すべきだ」： 米国Cato研究所副所長の意見


先日のメール(04/12/28)で、最近米国で「北朝鮮の核問題に対応するため韓国と日本の核兵器開発を認めるべきだ」という趣旨の論文（筆者はワシントンのCato InstituteのCarpenter副所長ら）が発表され、
専門家の間で評判になっていることをお知らせしました。これまでの日本核武装容認論とは若干趣を異にした論旨ですが、北朝鮮の核問題解決の目途が一向に立たず苛立っている最近の米国内の状況をある程度反映しているように思われます。その後この論文に関する新聞報道や論評がいくつか出ておりますので、まとめてご紹介します。ご参考まで。
--KK

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◆「韓日の核武装も許すべき」
　　　（Joongang日報　　2004/12/24）
http://japanese.joins.com/php/article.php?sv=jnews&src=nk&cont=nk0&aid=20041224162537500

　北朝鮮の核問題をめぐる６カ国協議が失敗し、北朝鮮が核を保有するようになれば、韓国と日本の核武装も許すべき、だとの見方が出ている。米ワシントンの進歩的シンクタンク「ケイトー研究所」のカーペンター副所長とバンドー先任研究員は、今月初旬に出版した冊子「韓国の難題：苦境に処した米国の南北（韓国・北朝鮮）政策」で、こうした見方を示した。
  ２人はこの冊子を通じて、北朝鮮が核技術を販売するスーパーマーケットにならない限り、北朝鮮への先制攻撃は避けるべきだと指摘した。同時に、北朝鮮が核を放棄する可能性が薄いだけに、次善の策として、韓国と日本の核武装を許し、北東アジアの核バランスを保つべき、だとしている。
  また、韓国の反米感情などを考慮し「韓国と米国はそろそろ離婚すべき時点にあり、約５０年間持続してきた韓米相互防衛条約を廃棄し、在韓米軍も撤退しなければならない」とした。１９７７年に設立された同研究所は超党派的な政策研究機関で、ブッシュ政府の外交政策を批判し、在韓米軍の撤退を呼びかけてきた。

　　　　姜賛昊（カン・チャンホ）特派員 < stoncold@joongang.co.kr >

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◆「北核解決に向け韓日の核武装許可すべき」
 　 　(朝鮮日報　　2004/12/24）
http://japanese.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2004/12/24/20041224000072.html

　米国が北朝鮮の核問題を解決するには、韓国と日本の核兵器開発を認めるべきだとゲート研究所のテッド・カーペンター（Carpenter）外交・安保政策研究担当副所長が主張した。

　カーペンター副所長は最近は発行された「韓国の謎：頭を抱える米国の南北関係」と題した本で、韓日の核開発により、北朝鮮が核開発への意志を再検討する可能性があると述べている。
　
　同副所長はこうした方策を進めても、北朝鮮が核開発を放棄しない可能性もあるが、とはいえ、北東アジアにおける新しい核の勢力均衡が登場し、北朝鮮の核独占に代わることができると主張した。

　同副所長は、北朝鮮に賄賂を与えて核を放棄するよう働きかける方法は再びだまされる可能性が高く、先制攻撃は韓半島の戦争につながりかねないので、負担が多き過ぎるとし、新しい経済制裁策も効果を上げるとはいえないので、韓日の核開発は今のところ最善策になりうると主張した。

　韓日の核開発は、北朝鮮が核で持って韓日を脅かすことができない上、かえって核を保有した韓日と立ち向かわなければならないという負担を与え、北朝鮮を核放棄に導くという。同副所長は米国が韓日に対し、これ以上安保問題において米国を頼りにしてはならないという点を通告し、自ら核を開発するかどうか決定させねばばならないとしている。

　また、北朝鮮が核を放棄していない状況では在韓米軍は“核の人質”になるとし、米軍がこうした危険に晒される必要はないと主張した。

　同副所長はテキサス大学で米国外交史研究で博士号を取得し、現在はワシントンの公共政策研究機関のケイトー研究所で活動している。


　　　　　ワシントン＝姜仁仙（カン・インソン）特派員 insun@chosun.com

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◆Not All Nuclear Is Bad
　　　
　　by Ted Galen Carpenter
　　(December 21, 2004)

The conventional wisdom is that all instances of nuclear weapons
proliferation threaten the stability of the international system and the
security interests of the United States.

Indeed, that is the underlying logic of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
adopted by the bulk of the international community in the late 1960s, which
is the centerpiece of the existing non-proliferation system.

Members of the arms-control community have over the decades spent an
enormous amount of time and energy agonizing over the possibility that
stable, democratic status quo powers such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and
South Korea might decide to abandon the NPT and develop nuclear deterrents.

Indeed, they have devoted at least as much attention to that problem as they
have to the prospect that unstable or aggressive states might build nuclear
arsenals.

The recent flap over the small scale (and probably unauthorized) nuclear
experiments in South Korea is merely the latest example of such misplaced
priorities.

The hostility toward all forms of proliferation is not confined to dovish
arms-control types but extends across the political spectrum.

As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolved in 2002 and 2003, some of the
most hawkish members of the U.S. foreign policy community became terrified
at the prospect that America's democratic allies in East Asia might build
their own nuclear deterrents to offset Pyongyang's moves.

Neo-conservative luminaries Robert Kagan and William Kristol regarded such
proliferation with horror: The possibility that Japan, and perhaps even
Taiwan, might respond to North Korea's actions by producing their own
nuclear weapons, thus spurring an East Asian nuclear arms race ... is
something that should send chills up the spine of any sensible American
strategist.

That attitude misconstrues the problem. A threat to the peace may exist if
an aggressive and erratic regime gets nukes and then is able to intimidate
or blackmail its non-nuclear neighbors.

Nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers do
not threaten the peace of the region.

Kagan and Kristol - and other Americans who share their hostility toward
such countries having nuclear weapons - implicitly accept a moral
equivalence between a potential aggressor and its potential victims.

America's non-proliferation policy is the international equivalent of
domestic gun-control laws -- and exhibits the same faulty logic. Gun control
laws have had little effect on preventing criminal elements from acquiring
weapons.

Instead, they disarm honest citizens and make them more vulnerable to armed
predators. The non-proliferation system is having a similar perverse effect.

Such unsavory states as Iran and North Korea are well along on the path to
becoming nuclear weapons powers while their more peaceful neighbors are
hamstrung by the NPT from countering those moves.

The focus of Washington's non-proliferation policy should substitute
discrimination and selectivity for uniformity of treatment.

U.S. policymakers must rid themselves of the notion that all forms of
proliferation are equally bad. The United States should concentrate on
making it difficult for aggressive or unstable regimes to acquire the
technology and fissile material needed to develop nuclear weapons.

Policymakers must adopt a realistic attitude about the limitations of even
that more tightly focused non-proliferation policy. At best, U.S. actions
will only delay, not prevent, such states from joining the nuclear weapons
club.

But delay can provide important benefits. A delay of only a few years may
significantly reduce the likelihood that an aggressive power with a new
nuclear weapons capability will have a regional nuclear monopoly and be able
to blackmail non-nuclear neighbors.

In some cases, the knowledge that the achievement of a regional nuclear
monopoly is impossible may discourage a would-be expansionist power from
even making the effort. At the very least, it could cause such a power to
configure its new arsenal purely for deterrence rather than design it for
aggressive purposes.

Washington's non-proliferation efforts should focus on delaying rogue states
in their quest for nuclear weapons, not beating up on peaceful states that
might want to become nuclear powers for their own protection.

The other key objective of a new U.S. proliferation policy should be to
prevent unfriendly nuclear states from transferring their weapons or nuclear
know-how to terrorist adversaries of the United States.

Those objectives are daunting enough without continuing the vain and
counterproductive effort to prevent all forms of proliferation.

Ted Galen Carpenter is a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign
Policy and vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato
Institute. His latest book, co-authored with Doug Bandow, is Korean
Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea
(Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).

All rights reserved. Copyright 2004 by United Press International.


http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2004/12/not_all_nuclear_1.php

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◆Amazon Co.のブックレビュー

From Publishers Weekly

Pull the plug on "security free-rider" South Korea, advise two Cato
Institute East Asia policy experts in this blunt analysis of the nuclear
crisis on the Korean peninsula. Despite suspicions that North Korea has
jumpstarted its nuclear program, Iraq and the war on terror trump South
Korea as vital U.S. national security interests. Therefore, "it is well past
time for South Korea to become somewhat more self reliant," believe
Carpenter and Bandow, adding that, unless Pyongyang becomes "the global
Wal-Mart of nuclear technology," America must avoid preemptive military
action. To end the stalemate, the authors recommend a two-tier strategy of
negotiations and on-demand inspections. In return, Pyongyang would receive
renewed fuel oil shipments, a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the
South and other concessions. But North Koreas "long record of perfidy on
nuclear issues" suggests East Asia may have to learn to live with a nuclear
"totalitarian hellhole," with the burden of containment falling on South
Korea, Japan, China and Russia. The authors also laud the volatile idea that
Japan or South Korea or both develop nuclear arsenals to offset the North
Korean threat. Indeed, Japan emerges as the "one credible candidate to
supplant the United States as regional stabilizer." While Carpenter and
Bandow acknowledge that nuclear weapons remain a sensitive issue in both
countries, they also dismiss "East Asian apprehension about a more
assertive" Japan as "paranoid fantasy." Nevertheless, a regional nuclear
arms race fueled by Japans acquisition of nuclear weapons may produce more
destabilization than the authors anticipate. Can the U.S. secure an
"amicable divorce" from South Korea on these terms? Carpenter and Bandows
matter-of-fact answers will pique the interest of audiences attuned to the
nuances of contemporary East Asian politics.
Copyright c Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.

http://www.amazon.co.jp/exec/obidos/ASIN/1403965455/qid=1104018413/sr=1-23/ref=sr_1_2_23/249-9944080-8764312

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◆The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South
　Korea
　
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
BOOK FORUM
Wednesday, January 12, 2005
12:00 PM (Luncheon to follow)

Featuring Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy
Studies, Cato Institute; Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; with
comments by Don Oberdorfer, Former Washington Post correspondent, author of
The Two Koreas; Selig Harrison, Director of the Asia Project, Center for
International Policy, author of Korean Endgame

The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001

Asia poses some of the greatest foreign policy challenges for policymakers
on both sides of the Pacific. In Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled
Relations with North and South Korea, Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow
question whether Washington’s East Asia security strategy makes sense any
longer given the possibility of a nuclear-armed North Korea and the fraying
ties between the United States and South Korea. The prospect of U.S. troops
stationed in South Korea becoming nuclear hostages makes it imperative to
reconsider U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula and throughout East Asia. The
book provides a candid assessment of America’s position in East Asia and
the wider world. Please join us for an important, timely forum with the
authors and two distinguished discussants.

Cato book forums and luncheons are free of charge. To register for this
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http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101fabook84152b/ted-galen-doug-bandow