EEE会議（プルトニウムや高濃縮ウランを国際管理下に：IAEA事務局長の重要提案）...............03.11.06
目下ニューヨークで開催中の国連総会で１１月３日、国際原子力機関(IAEA)のエルバ
ラダイ事務局長が年次報告演説を行いました。
この報告では、まず、現在全世界の発電量の１６％が原子力発電であること、建設中
の原子炉３３基のうち２０基がアジアであること、米国では１０基の原子炉の寿命が
６０年に延長され、さらに多くの炉についても延長申請が行なわれていること、原子
力平和利用の技術面（とくに非発電分野）でいろいろな進展がみられることを等々を
概説したのち、核拡散防止問題に関しては、とくに核テロの危険性に対処するため核
物質の物的防護措置を一層強化すべきこと、まだ４６ヵ国がNPTに基く保障措置（核
査察）協定をIAEAと締結しておらず、追加議定書についてはまだ１５０ヵ国がこれを
発効させていないこと等を指摘し、IAEAの権限が真に普遍的なものからほど遠いのは
甚だ遺憾であると述べています。さらに現在国際的にホットな問題となっている北朝
鮮、イラク、イラン等に対する核査察に関しては、IAEAがその任務を遂行する上で
数々の困難に遭遇しているとして、これら各国の協力姿勢を強く呼びかけています。
さらに事務局長は、一層増大する核拡散の脅威に効果的に対処するために、次の２つ
の具体的な提案を行なっております。
（１）民間（非軍事）原子力計画における兵器転用可能な核物質（分離されたプルト
ニウムと高濃縮ウラン）の生成を制限するとともに、今後再処理と濃縮活動は多国間
管理下の施設においてのみ行なわれるようにすること。
（２）現在５０カ国以上が使用済み核燃料を一時的な保管場所に貯蔵しているが、す
べての国が処分に適した地質条件を備えているわけではないので、これらの使用済み
燃料や放射性廃棄物の管理・処分を多国間方式で行なうようにすること。
この２つの提案は、今後国際的に非常に重要な意味を持つものと思いますので、その
部分の原文（英文）を以下に抜粋しておきます。
In
light of the increasing threat of proliferation, both by States and
by
terrorists, one idea that may now be worth serious consideration is
the
advisability of limiting the processing of weapon-usable material
(separated
plutonium and high enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear
programmes - as
well as the production of new material through reprocessing
and enrichment -
by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively to
facilities under
multinational control. These limitations would naturally
need to be
accompanied by appropriate rules of assurance of supply for
would-be users.
We should equally consider multinational approaches to
the management and
disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Over 50
countries currently
have spent fuel stored in temporary locations, awaiting
reprocessing or
disposal. Not all countries have the appropriate geological
conditions for
such disposal - and, for many countries with small nuclear
programmes, the
financial and human resources required for the construction
and operation of
a geological disposal facility are daunting.
Taken
together, these proposals in my view would provide enhanced assurance
to the
international community that the sensitive portions of civilian
nuclear fuel
cycle programmes are not vulnerable to
misuse.
ご参考までに、事務局長演説の全文（ＩＡＥＡホームページにのっているもの）を以
下に掲げておきますので、関心のある方は精読をお勧めします。
また、本件演説に関する新聞報道（共同通信電）もご紹介します。 なお、これらの
情報は、最近EEE会議の特別会員になられたある方からご教示いただいたものです。
--KK
***************************************
ウランなどの国際管理要請 ＩＡＥＡが年次報告
【ニューヨーク３日共同】国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）のエルバラダイ事務局長は
３日、国連総会に２００２年の年次報告書を提出、一部国家やテロリストからの「増
大する脅威」に強い警戒感を示した上で、兵器に転用可能な世界中のウランやプルト
ニウムをすべて国際的な管理下に置く必要性を訴えた。
事務局長は、北朝鮮による核拡散防止条約（ＮＰＴ）脱退宣言など「深刻かつ緊急
な試練」にあらためて懸念を表明。イランの核問題や放射性物質の違法取引など、解
決すべき課題が数多くあると指摘し、現状は「緊張が高まっている」との認識を示し
た。
その上で、民間の核開発などでも、兵器として転用可能な物質の加工については一
定の制限を加えるという考え方も「真剣に考慮する価値があるかもしれない」とし
た。
北朝鮮の核問題については、対話による包括的解決を目指すべきだと述べ、６カ国
協議への期待を表明した。（共同通信）[11月4日9時4分更新]
3
November 2003 | New York, USA
Statement To the Fifty-Eighth Regular Session
of the United Nations General
Assembly
by IAEA Director General Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei
The past year has been a time of significant challenges
and achievements for
the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the area of
nuclear
non-proliferation, the Agency has been at the centre of attention and
has
demonstrated its ability to perform objective and credible verification
-
but we continue to face a number of difficult and unresolved situations.
In
the area of nuclear safety and security, our work is making a difference
and
we see overall improvement, but much remains to be done. In the
nuclear
technology field, the Agency is contributing to sustainable
development
through its technical co-operation programme, with the benefits
of nuclear
applications increasingly recognized. And while nuclear power
continues to
hold great potential as an environmentally clean source of
energy, it
remains in a holding position due to a number of associated
concerns.
Today provides an opportunity for me to review with you in more
detail some
of the Agency's activities in each of these areas.
Nuclear
Technology
Nuclear Power
The urgent need for sustained human
development will clearly necessitate
increases in the supply of energy in the
coming decades. In recent years,
nuclear power has supplied about 16% of
world electricity production, and it
remains the only energy source that can
provide electricity on a large scale
with comparatively minimal impact on the
environment.
Of the 33 power reactors currently under construction, 20
are in Asia. In
other regions, the more immediate focus is on power upgrades,
restarts of
previously shutdown reactors and licence extensions. For example,
in the
United States of America, 16 reactors have had their operating
licences
extended to 60 years, and many more applications are under
review.
The long term prospects for nuclear power, however, will depend
on the
industry's success in addressing concerns associated with waste
disposal,
proliferation, safety and security, while also improving the
economic
competitiveness of future reactors. Nearly 20 IAEA Member States
are
currently involved in projects to develop reactor and fuel cycle
designs
that would address some of these concerns, and a number of countries
are
also exploring the nuclear co-generation of hydrogen, to address demands
for
cleaner energy in the transportation sector.
Non-Power Nuclear
Applications
Under the technical co-operation programmes of the IAEA,
nuclear
applications are gaining increasing importance as tools for social
and
economic development.
Human Health: The number of new cancer cases
per year in the developing
world is expected to double to 10 million by 2015,
as life expectancy
increases and lifestyles change. However, most developing
countries do not
have sufficient numbers of health professionals or
radiotherapy machines to
treat their cancer patients effectively. Indeed,
some 15 African nations and
several countries in Asia lack even one radiation
therapy machine. The
Agency has been working with key partners such as WHO to
provide training,
expert missions and equipment to support national and
regional radiotherapy
programmes - as well as projects in nuclear medicine,
nutrition studies and
many other health related areas. A highly visible
result of Agency support
across Africa has been an increase of approximately
35%, over the past five
years, in the number of cancer patients receiving
treatment in participating
countries of the African Regional Co-operative
Agreement (AFRA) - an
increase of approximately 6500 patients per
year.
Water Resources Management: More than one sixth of the world's
population
lives in areas without adequate access to safe drinking water - a
situation
that is expected to worsen significantly unless the international
community
takes prompt and effective action. Isotope hydrology is being used,
in more
than 80 Agency projects, to map underground aquifers, manage surface
water
and groundwater, detect and control pollution, and monitor dam leakage
and
safety. For example, an ongoing regional isotope hydrology project in
Latin
America has brought together more than 30 water institutes to address
water
shortages, with the successful completion of conceptual models for a
total
of seven aquifers in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and
Peru.
Plant Mutation and Breeding: For many years, the Agency has been
working
with Member States on mutation breeding of major food crops that
yield very
well in different ecological conditions. One example is the
improvement in
rice varieties in Asia and the Pacific region. In a harvesting
ceremony in
August, the Indonesian Government gave recognition to the
positive and
sustained economic impact of a variety of rice with higher yield
and better
quality, produced using gamma rays, which has successfully been
introduced
in 20 Indonesian provinces. We anticipate the release of at least
seven new
varieties of rice in the region during the next three to five
years.
Technical Co-operation Programme: The Agency's technical
co-operation (TC)
programme provides about $80 million of assistance per
year, and continues
to be a principal mechanism for implementing the Agency's
basic mission:
"Atoms for Peace". The Secretariat continues to work on
measures to ensure
that TC projects such as those I have mentioned achieve
lasting and concrete
benefits to recipient Member States. Efforts are
proceeding to improve the
planning of national TC strategies through early
and direct dialogue with
Member States, to ensure strong government
commitment and to focus on fewer
but higher quality projects. We have
expanded our monitoring of the impact
of TC projects, in order to increase
project quality, relevance,
effectiveness and sustainability. And we continue
to build and expand
partnerships with other international organizations and
development
partners, with a view towards leveraging the Agency's limited
resources,
attracting greater attention to the benefits of nuclear
technologies, and in
some cases drawing on the technical expertise of other
organizations to
enhance the impact of a nuclear technique.
Nuclear
Safety and Security
The safety and security of nuclear activities around
the globe remain a key
factor for the future of nuclear technology. It is
gratifying to note that
nuclear safety continues to improve at nuclear power
plants worldwide, that
more countries are raising their standards of
performance in radiation
protection, and that significant steps have been
taken in the past two years
to improve nuclear security.
One area that
still needs improvement involves learning from past
experience. When events
occur at nuclear facilities, it is essential that
this operating experience -
the lessons learned - be properly communicated
to other relevant nuclear
facilities and, as applicable, be incorporated
into their operational
practices. This remains an area of current focus.
Status of International
Conventions
The development and adoption of legally binding norms has proven
to be a
powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. The Early
Notification
and Assistance Conventions continue to serve as mechanisms for
Agency
response missions to States Party during emergencies. The Agency
is
increasing its involvement in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, by
reporting
as requested on the trends and issues observed during our various
safety
missions. And the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management has now been in
force for
over two years. However, many States are not yet party to these
conventions,
and certain key areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are still not
subject to
conventions.
One convention that has gained increased
attention recently is the 1979
>Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM). In the
past two years, 20 additional States have
become party to the Convention,
reflecting the importance of the
international nuclear security regime.
States are now working on a much
needed amendment to broaden the scope of
the Convention, that I hope will be
adopted soon.
Safety Standards
I am pleased to report good progress in
the continuing revision and updating
of international nuclear safety
standards. Upgrades to all existing Agency
standards should be completed by
late next year. Over the next three to four
years, we hope to fill in the
remaining gaps in coverage - such as safety
standards on geological waste
repositories - and to implement a more
coherent structure for the body of
IAEA standards. These standards should be
accepted and implemented worldwide,
as the global reference for nuclear and
radiation safety.
Safety
Services
The Agency's safety review and appraisal services assist Member
States in
the application of IAEA safety standards, and provide useful
feedback on
their effectiveness. These services originated predominantly in
the field of
nuclear installation safety, but now extend to cover many areas
of
radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety as well. I should
note
that, in particular, safety services and assistance to countries of
Central
and Eastern Europe operating power reactors has been at the centre of
the
technical co-operation programmes of those countries for the past decade
-
resulting in a broad and significant positive impact on the
operational
safety of those facilities. Demand for Agency services continues
to be very
strong; the Agency's Annual Report for 2002 lists more than 60
safety
missions of various types to 29 States. Collectively, the results of
the
services constitute a substantial body of safety experience from around
the
world.
Protection Against Nuclear and Radiological
Terrorism
Agency efforts to help Member States improve their protection
against
nuclear and radiological terrorism are continuing at an exceptionally
fast
pace on multiple fronts. Since September 2001, working in Europe,
Asia,
Latin America and Africa, we have conducted nearly 40 advisory
and
evaluation missions, and convened more than 50 training courses,
workshops
and seminars. The IAEA also has strengthened its co-operation on
nuclear
security issues with other international organizations, including the
UN and
its specialized agencies, Interpol, Europol, the Universal Postal
Union and
the European Commission.
Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources: Despite the increased attention
given to the security of radioactive
sources since September 2001, some
deficiencies remain. Information in the
Agency database of illicit
trafficking, combined with reports of discoveries
of plans for radiological
dispersal devices, makes it clear that a market
continues to exist for
obtaining and using radioactive sources for malevolent
purposes. Agency
evaluation missions have been held throughout Eastern
Europe, Africa and
Central America to assess Member State capabilities to
detect nuclear and
other radioactive material at their borders, and to help
them respond to
illicit trafficking. In the past year, IAEA missions to a
number of States
have assisted in the recovery, characterization and securing
of radioactive
sources seized in trafficking incidents. The Agency will
continue its
efforts to improve source safety and
security.
Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Events of the
past year have placed the nuclear non-proliferation regime
under stress on
multiple fronts, and have made it clear that concrete steps
to strengthen the
regime are urgently required. The Agency's role as an
independent, objective
verification body remains central to the
effectiveness of the
regime.
The IAEA's verification activities are designed to provide
assurance that
nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for
peaceful purposes.
In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine
nuclear weapons
programme in Iraq, the international community committed
itself to provide
the Agency the authority to strengthen its verification
capability -
specifically, its ability to provide assurance not only that
declared
nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes,
but
equally important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities
exist.
This broader authority, however, is still far from universal.
Regrettably,
46 States have yet to fulfil their legal obligations under the
NPT to bring
safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and more than
six years
after the IAEA Board's approval of the Model Additional Protocol,
over 150
countries still do not have an additional protocol in
force.
I strongly urge all States that have not done so to conclude and
bring into
force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols
at an
early date. As I have repeatedly stated, for the Agency to provide
the
required assurances, it must have the required
authority.
Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRK
The situation in
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues
to pose a serious
and immediate challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. Since
December 2002, the Agency has not performed any verification
activities in
the DPRK, and cannot therefore provide any level of assurance
about the
non-diversion of nuclear material. We have continued to emphasize
the need
for a comprehensive settlement of the Korean crisis through
dialogue, and it
is my hope that the six-party talks will lead to such a
settlement. I trust
that any future settlement will ensure, inter alia, the
return of the DPRK to
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that the
Agency will be given the
necessary authority and resources to be able to
fulfil its responsibilities
under the NPT in a credible manner.
Implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions Relating to
Iraq
After an interruption of
nearly four years, last November the Agency resumed
verification activities
in Iraq under the mandate provided by UN Security
Council Resolution 687 and
related resolutions. Between November 2002 and
March 2003, the Agency sought
to determine what, if anything, had changed in
Iraq over the previous four
years relevant to Iraq's nuclear activities and
capabilities.
At the
time the Agency ceased its Security Council verification activities
in Iraq,
we had found no evidence of the revival of nuclear activities
prohibited
under relevant Security Council resolutions. However, considering
our
four-year absence, the time available for the renewed inspections was
not
sufficient for the Agency to complete its overall review and
assessment.
The Agency's mandate in Iraq under various Security Council
resolutions
still stands. In May, the Security Council adopted resolution
1483 in which,
inter alia, it expressed its intention to revisit the mandates
of the IAEA
and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission
(UNMOVIC). We are awaiting the results of that review and further
guidance
from the Council. Given the situation in Iraq, I believe it would be
prudent
for the UN and IAEA inspectors to return to Iraq, to bring the
weapons file
to a closure - and, through implementation of a Security Council
approved
plan for long term monitoring, to provide ongoing assurance that
activities
related to weapons of mass destruction have not been resumed. In
the
meantime, I trust that the Agency will be kept informed of the outcome
of
any current inspection activities in Iraq relevant to our mandate,
in
accordance with Security Council resolution 1441.
Application of
IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East
Pursuant to the mandate given to me by the
IAEA General Conference, I have
continued to consult with the States of the
Middle East region on the
application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear
activities in the Middle
East, and on the development of model agreements
relevant to the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the region. I
regret to
report that due to the prevailing situation in the region I have
not been in
a position to make progress on the implementation of this
important mandate,
which is of direct relevance to non-proliferation and
security in the Middle
East. With the active co-operation of all concerned, I
hope to move this
mandate forward in the coming year. It is essential, in my
view, that a
comprehensive settlement in the Middle East be accompanied by a
regional
security structure that includes the establishment of the Middle
East as a
zone free from weapons of mass destruction. In my view a durable
peace will
not be attained without an adequate security structure, which in
turn is
difficult to achieve without a peaceful settlement. The two must go
hand in
hand.
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of
Iran
The Board of Governors this year has given
considerable attention to the
implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement
in the Islamic Republic of
Iran. In September, the Board adopted a resolution
urging Iran to show
proactive and accelerated co-operation, and to
demonstrate full transparency
by providing the Agency with a declaration of
all its nuclear activities.
The Board made clear that it was essential and
urgent for all outstanding
issues to be brought to closure as soon as
possible, to enable the Agency to
provide the required
assurances.
Recently we have received what the Iranian authorities have
said is a full
and accurate declaration of its past and current nuclear
activities and are
in the process of verifying this declaration which is key
to our ability to
provide comprehensive assurance. Iran has also expressed
its intention to
conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement
which is key to
our ability to provide comprehensive assurance. I will report
to the IAEA
Board later this month on the status of our implementation of
safeguards in
Iran.
Addressing Non-Proliferation Challenges
Looking
forward, it is clear that the Agency must have the required
authority,
information and resources to be able to provide the international
community
with the credible nonproliferation assurances required under the
NPT. In that
context, the international community must work hard to achieve
the
universality of the regime. We must also be more assertive in resolving
the
root causes of global insecurity - such as longstanding regional
conflicts
and other causes of instability - which provide incentives for
the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
And,
we must work together to develop and establish a system of
collective
security that does not depend on nuclear weapons, and accelerate
the process
of nuclear disarmament.
Recent events have made it clear
that the non-proliferation regime is under
growing stress. The current world
situation is different, in many respects,
from that of the late 1960s, when
the NPT was being negotiated. A key
difference is that information and
expertise on how to produce nuclear
weapons has become far much more
accessible. This places extra emphasis on
the importance of controlling
access to weapon-usable nuclear material.
In light of the increasing
threat of proliferation, both by States and by
terrorists, one idea that may
now be worth serious consideration is the
advisability of limiting the
processing of weapon-usable material (separated
plutonium and high enriched
uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes - as
well as the production of new
material through reprocessing and enrichment -
by agreeing to restrict these
operations exclusively to facilities under
multinational control. These
limitations would naturally need to be
accompanied by appropriate rules of
assurance of supply for would-be users.
We should equally consider
multinational approaches to the management and
disposal of spent fuel and
radioactive waste. Over 50 countries currently
have spent fuel stored in
temporary locations, awaiting reprocessing or
disposal. Not all countries
have the appropriate geological conditions for
such disposal - and, for many
countries with small nuclear programmes, the
financial and human resources
required for the construction and operation of
a geological disposal facility
are daunting.
Taken together, these proposals in my view would provide
enhanced assurance
to the international community that the sensitive portions
of civilian
nuclear fuel cycle programmes are not vulnerable to
misuse.
Conclusion
The Agency continues to play a key role in
ensuring that the benefits of
nuclear technology are shared globally for
economic and social development,
that nuclear activities are conducted
safely, that nuclear and radioactive
materials and facilities are adequately
protected, and that a credible
inspection regime exists to verify compliance
with non-proliferation
commitments.
This year marks the 50th
anniversary of the 'Atoms for Peace' speech
delivered before this body by
President Eisenhower, in which he articulated
a vision, shared by many world
leaders, that would enable humanity to make
full use of the benefit of
nuclear energy while minimizing its risk. This
vision led to the
establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Much has changed
since that time, and I believe it is appropriate for us to
take stock of our
successes and failures - and to resolve to pursue whatever
actions are
required, including new ways of thinking and unconventional
approaches, to
ensure that nuclear energy remains a source of hope and
prosperity, and not a
tool for self-destruction.
Let me conclude by expressing my continuing
gratitude to the Government of
Austria, which has now served for over four
decades as a most gracious and
welcoming host to the IAEA.