EEE会議（イランは第２の北朝鮮になる？）...........................................................................031024
イランの核兵器開発問題は、英仏独３ヶ国外相とイラン政府の共同宣言により
解決の兆しが見えてきたようにも思われますが、米国はこの共同宣言は「眉唾も
の」だとみており、警戒を緩めておりません。小生も、現在のイラン問題は、１０年
前
の米朝枠組み合意のときと似ており、結局その後北朝鮮の核開発阻止が空振りに
終わったように、単なる時間稼ぎに過ぎないのではないかという気がします。
３ヶ国外相の努力を全く評価しないわけではありませんが、３ヶ国はイラク戦争の
ときと同じように所詮「第３者」であって、イラクの核兵器を自らへの脅威とは見て
いません。米国はそれをもろに脅威と見ているわけで、ここに基本的な違いがあり、
ブッシュ政権としては引き続き徹底的にイランの「核潰し」を図るはずです。 た
だ、
イラク戦争の後遺症がまだ完治しておらず、大統領選挙を控えているので、イラク
のときより一層慎重にはなるでしょう。
他方、イラン側の主張は、核兵器開発を断念すれば、原子力発電面では国際的
な支援を必ず約束してくれるのか、ということで、これは核不拡散条約（ＮＰＴ）の
第４条（原子力平和利用の権利の保障）とも絡む非常に重要な問題で、さしあたり
上記３カ国やIAEAが（米国の反対を押し切って）どこまでイランの要求に応じられ
るか、がポイントとなるでしょう。もしイランが満足するような支援が得られなけれ
ば、
核兵器開発を続行するぞ、と言い出すことは間違いありません。
ところで、我々日本人にとって今後の問題は少なくとも２つ。１つは、北朝鮮が
イラン問題の成り行きを固唾を飲んで見守っているはずで、北朝鮮とイランが
悪智恵を競い合っていろいろ複雑な連携プレーを展開してくるだろうから、対応
が益々難しくなるだろうということ。 もう１つは、例のアザデガン油田開発問題が
どうなるか、とうことです。 イランに対しては、ロシアや中国も石油利権を狙って
裏で盛んに動いているようですから、日本としては今後とも油断は出来ません。
結局日本だけが損をする、ということにならねばいいですが。
こうしたイラン問題を考える上で、次の論文（New
York Times,
10/23)は大変参考
になると思います。論者は小生の友人の１人で、信用できます。
--KK
********************************************
The
Mullahs and the Bomb
By GARY MILHOLLIN
Published: October 23,
2003
WASHINGTON With much fanfare, and the reluctant endorsement of the
Bush
administration, Iran has vowed to suspend its controversial effort
to
produce enriched uranium - which can be used as fuel in nuclear weapons
-
and to clear up a host of suspicions about its nuclear program. In
exchange,
the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany promised
new
"cooperation"- meaning trade - in high technology with Tehran.
While
perhaps getting any concessions out of the mullahs should be seen as a
step
forward, this particular deal won't prevent Iran from making the bomb.
It
also risks having the same outcome as the deal North Korea made in 1994
and
later violated, and threatens to drive a wedge between the United States
and
its European allies on Iran policy.
The suspicions about Iran's
nuclear aims are well founded. Leaving aside the
question whether such an
oil-rich country even needs nuclear power plants,
America has long questioned
why Iran is building a factory to enrich
uranium, material for which there is
no reasonable need in Iran's civilian
power program.
Iran also plans
to produce plutonium, another fuel for nuclear weapons, by
building a
40-megawatt heavy water reactor at Arak. This type of reactor,
too small for
electricity and larger than needed for research, is now
providing the fuel
for atomic weapons programs in India, Israel and
Pakistan. And Iran is
developing a fleet of long-range missiles, which don't
make sense as a way to
deliver conventional warheads. The only logical
purpose of such missiles is
to carry nuclear ones.
International suspicions about these programs led
to the current crisis: the
International Atomic Energy Agency has given Iran
until Oct. 31 to explain
how mysterious traces of bomb-grade uranium got into
two Iranian nuclear
sites. Iran says the traces arrived on contaminated
imports; the other
explanation is that Iran has been secretly enriching
uranium in violation of
its inspection agreement with the agency. The agency
also wants to know how
Iran developed such a high level of enrichment
technology without secretly
testing it with nuclear material, which is also
forbidden. The agency's
experts are convinced that the testing
occurred.
Under the new deal, Iran is supposed to explain all this. If it
doesn't, it
risks being condemned as a pariah by the Security Council and the
European
Union may have to shelve its trade agreement with Iran, which would
cost all
concerned a lot of money. Thus Britain, France and Germany, as well
as Iran,
have an interest in seeing Iran comply.
But the problem is,
even if Iran does so, there will be little assurance
that the deal will
really dampen Iran's nuclear hopes. Consider what
happened with the pact
hammered out by the Clinton administration with North
Korea in 1994, which
had much in common with the present situation.
North Korea faced
worldwide condemnation and a possible war with the United
States after
violating its inspection agreement with the International
Atomic Energy
Agency. By agreeing to suspend its effort to produce
plutonium, North Korea
avoided censure and got economic benefits from the
West, and yet it preserved
its nuclear potential intact. North Korea's 8,000
fuel rods - containing five
bombs' worth of plutonium - never left the
country. Like a sword poised over
the world's head, they remained only
months away from being converted into
bomb fuel - something that the North
Koreans say was finally done this
summer. The North Korean bomb program only
shifted into neutral; now it is
back in gear.
Under Tuesday's deal Iran, too, will shift into neutral,
while keeping its
nuclear potential intact. It won't - for the time being -
operate its newly
constructed centrifuges, which are needed to enrich uranium
to weapon grade.
But the deal won't stop Iran from building more centrifuges
to augment the
limited number it now has, thus adding to its future ability
to enrich
uranium. Nor does the agreement bar Iran from completing the
factory that
produces the uranium gas that goes into the centrifuges. Nor
does it prevent
the building of the heavy water reactor or, indeed, the
resumption of
enrichment in the future. Thus the agreement could insulate
Iran from
international censure without hampering its nuclear progress in any
way.
These defects won't be cured by Iran's acceptance of more
rigorous
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
inspectors' new
rights are still weaker than those that were enjoyed by their
counterparts
in Iraq - and we all know that the Iraqis repeatedly foiled
those efforts
with delays and obfuscation.
The only real solution is
to convince Iran to dismantle all the plants that
can make fuel for nuclear
weapons. This would remove the threat that Iran
could go back into the bomb
business on a moment's notice, and the country
could still benefit from the
electricity generated by its Russian-supplied
reactor at Bushehr, which
should be sufficient if Iran truly wants only
civilian nuclear
power.
This goal is what the Europeans hope to achieve in the long run.
It would
probably satisfy the United States as well. But the current
agreement won't
take us there, and it may lead to the same sort of bickering
between the
United States and its vital allies that fractured international
action on
North Korea and Iraq.
The only chance for a solution to the
Iran nuclear problem, short of war, is
for a united West to apply relentless
economic pressure. That means quickly
closing any gap between Europe and the
United States. It may be possible to
convince Iran that the costs of building
nuclear weapons exceed the benefit
of having them. Unlike North Korea, Iran
has large trade interests that
really matter. However, unless the rest of the
world is willing to put those
interests at risk, it will probably soon have
to live with a new nuclear
power in the Middle East.
Gary
Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.