EEE会議(米国の小型核兵器の開発計画:ケネディ議員の意見)..................................2003.9.24
ブッシュ大統領は昨日の国連演説で、核拡散防止の重要性を強調しましたが、一方
で、「ミニ核兵器」や地中貫通核爆弾「バンカーバスター」など一連の新型核兵器の
開発を進めており、米国がこうした「危険なダブル・スタンダード」政策を取ってい
る限り、国際的な理解は得られず、過去半世紀続いてきた核軍縮体制は崩壊するだろ
うーーーと警告しているのは民主党きってのハト派、エドワード・ケネディ、ダイア
ン・フェインスタイン両上院議員です。両議員によれば、「ミニ核兵器」といっても
5キロトン(広島の約半分)もあり、バンカー・バスターの現在の性能は、地中50
フィート(約17メートル)まで達することができるが、仮に1キロトンの核爆弾を
その深さで爆発させると、フットボール競技場以上の巨大な穴が開き、100万個以
上の放射性の破片やごみが四方八方に飛び散るだろう、ブッシュ政権はそのような危
険な小型核兵器を年間500発も製造する計画だ、と指摘しています。 詳細は、昨
日(9/23)付けロスアンジェルス・タイムズに載った両議員の寄稿論文でどうぞ。
--KK
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Bush's
Dangerous Nuclear Double Standard
With the White House pushing for
new types of warheads, other nations
may not heed the call for
nonproliferation.
By Edward M. Kennedy and Dianne Feinstein, Edward
M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)
is a senior member of the Senate
Armed Services
Committee. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) is a member of
the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
President Bush is expected to go to the United Nations
today and, with Iran
and North Korea obviously in mind, make a strong plea
for nuclear
nonproliferation.
But the president's words may ring
hollow to much of the world because here
at home we're embarking on a new and
dangerous plan to develop and build a
new generation of nuclear
weapons.
The circumstances are hardly auspicious at a moment when our
credibility in
the world community is tenuous.
Preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the greatest
challenges facing the
U.S. and the world community today. The Bush
administration says it strongly
supports that goal.
Yet, in a bill awaiting final action in Congress, the
administration is
asking for $21 million in appropriations for two new types
of nuclear
weapons, the so-called mini-nukes and what it calls a "robust
nuclear earth
penetrator," the so-called bunker-buster.
The
administration also wants funds for the design and site selection of
a
facility to produce these nuclear warheads and to expedite testing of
them.
Pursuing such weapons is a dangerous new direction in U.S. nuclear
policy,
with ominous implications for the war on terrorism and the delicate
balance
of international arms control protections.
How can we ask Iran
and North Korea to abandon their nuclear programs when
we begin to design,
build and test new nuclear weapons of our own?
There is nothing "mini"
about a mini-nuke. They are far from the type of
benign, surgical-strike
weapons that the name implies. One of these weapons,
carried by a terrorist
in a suitcase, could devastate any city in the U.S.
The blast from a
5-kiloton nuclear weapon ? the upper threshold of the
mini-nukes ? would be
half the size of the Hiroshima blast.
The bunker-busters supposedly would
be used against deeply buried, hardened
targets. Current technology will
allow a warhead to burrow up to 50 feet
into the ground. But detonating even
a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon at that
depth would produce a crater larger than a
football field and spew a million
cubic feet of radioactive dust and debris
into the atmosphere.
The requests to expedite the ability to test and
produce these new weapons
leaves no doubt about the administration's
strategy. Basically, it wants to
have these weapons available in our arsenal
and ready to use as soon as
possible.
The White House is asking for a
large-scale facility capable of producing up
to 500 of these warheads a
year.
That level far exceeds what would be needed to maintain our
current
stockpile of weapons in coming years, especially when we have pledged
to
reduce our stockpile by more than half in arms control
agreements.
The administration's new direction on nuclear weapons has
received far too
little attention in policy debates. It threatens to
undermine the entire
architecture of nuclear arms control that has been put
in place with great
difficulty over the last half a century.
We know
the real dangers we face in the world today. It is wrong to add
another one
by treating nuclear weapons as just another weapon in the
arsenal.
It
makes no sense to adopt a policy that makes their use more
likely.
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