各位殿

先のG8サミット（エヴィアン）でも、大量破壊兵器の脅威への対処が現下の国際社会
の急務であることが再確認されましたが、では今後いかにして大量破壊兵器（とくに
核兵器）の拡散を防止するかとなると、どの国も名案が浮かばないのが実情です。

いくら新たな国際条約や規制制度を作っても、それを強制する手段がなければ単なる
画餅に過ぎません。例えば、昨年１２月に米国CIA情報に基づきスペイン海軍がイ
エーメン向けのミサイルを積んだ北朝鮮船を臨検したものの、捕獲する所までは出来
なかったというケースがあるように、いつもCIA情報だけに頼っていてはどうしても
限界があり、結局「ならず者国」は野放しのままです。

他方、日本等「まじめ国」の立場からすると、現在以上に厳しい核拡散防止措置や国
際条約を作ればその分だけ原子力平和利用、とりわけ核燃料サイクル活動への規制を
増やすことになり、下手をすると六ヶ所再処理工場の運転にも支障が出てきかねませ
ん。そこが日本にとってまさにディレンマですが、そのことに気が付いている日本人
はどれだけいるでしょうか。

現在米国では、イラクで大量破壊兵器が未だに発見されていないため、次第に焦って
きており、その結果（米国への非難をかわすために）新たな国際規制措置や条約の締
結を求める声が一段と高まってきつつあります。次にご紹介するNew York Timesの社
説（6/8)もそのような論調を反映するものですが、日本としても徒に「対岸の火事」
視しないで、今後のブッシュ政権の動きに十分注意を払う必要があると思います。

金子熊夫（パリにて）

*************************************

New Tools for Arms Control

As if the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea were not alarming enough,
consider the prospect of Kim Jong Il's exporting surplus plutonium and
long-range missile components to other rogue states and terrorists. It is
easy to see why world leaders at the recent Group of 8 summit meeting in
France declared the spread of such unconventional weapons to be, along with
international terrorism, "the pre-eminent threat to international security."

Identifying the danger is not enough. The world clearly needs more effective
policies for containing the spread of weapons. As recent diplomatic
frustrations over Iraq, Iran and North Korea attest, no broad international
consensus yet exists on what kind of enforcement action nations can
legitimately take to thwart the development of these terrible weapons.

It is encouraging to see that the Bush administration is now proposing some
intriguing new ideas for reinforced international cooperation in this area.
The effort is especially notable in light of the administration's deplorable
record of devaluing international approaches to arms control. The issue of
unconventional weapons, like terrorism, is too big a problem to be countered
by one nation alone, even a country as powerful as America.

Current arms control treaties, though valuable, are not enough. Countries
can get around treaty prohibitions by refusing to sign relevant agreements,
as India, Pakistan and Israel have done, or abruptly withdrawing, as North
Korea did, or cheating, as Iraq and possibly Iran have done. But no country
has yet been able to develop unconventional weapons without some degree of
outside help. If such aid can be thwarted, either at the source, by stronger
export controls, or in transit, by naval or air interception of contraband
cargoes, proliferation can be much more effectively contained.

An example of what Washington now has in mind took place last December, when
Spanish naval vessels, acting on an American intelligence tip, intercepted a
North Korean missile shipment to Yemen. When the arms cargo turned out to be
legally purchased, it had to be released. New international agreements can
provide a more solid legal basis for such seizures. Of course, countries are
not likely to intercept suspect cargoes unless they consider the
intelligence information being provided by Washington and other sources to
be trustworthy. If these and other problems can be satisfactorily resolved,
the administration's latest proposals can expand ways of dealing with the
handful of problem countries that refuse to abide by major international
arms control treaties.